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Abstract—We design new secure on-off transmission schemes
in wiretap channels with outdated channel state information
(CSI). In our design we consider not only the outdated CSI from
the legitimate receiver but two distinct scenarios, depending on
whether or not the outdated CSI from the eavesdropper is known
at the transmitter. Under this consideration our schemes exploit
the useful knowledge contained in the available outdated CSI,
based on which the transmitter decides whether to transmit or
not. We derive new closed-form expressions for the transmission
probability, the connection outage probability, the secrecy outage
probability, and the reliable and secure transmission probability
to characterize the achievable performance. Based on these
results, we present the optimal solutions that maximize the
secrecy throughput under dual connection and secrecy outage
constraints. Our analytical and numerical results offer detailed
insights into the design of the wiretap coding parameters and
the imposed outage constraints. We further show that allowing
more freedom on the codeword transmission rate enables a larger
feasible region of the dual outage constraints by exploiting the
trade-off between reliability and security.
Index Terms—Secure transmission, on-off scheme, outdated
CSI, outage constraints, secrecy throughput.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE INHERENT openness of the wireless medium makeswireless data transmission difficult to be shielded from
unintended recipients. As such, secure transmission over wire-
less channels becomes a critical issue in the design of wireless
networks. Traditionally, security is viewed as an independent
feature guaranteed through higher layer techniques, e.g., cryp-
tographic protocols, assuming that an error-free physical layer
link has already been established [1]. In large scale dynamic
wireless networks, however, the high complexity of key dis-
tribution and management makes it difficult to achieve the
required security level with cryptographic methods alone [2].
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In contrast to cryptographic protocols, physical layer security
exploits the statistics of the channel at the physical layer to
protect wireless transmission against eavesdropping [3], [4].
Therefore, it has been widely recognized as a complement
to cryptographic protocols for security enhancement and thus
attracted enormous research efforts recently.
A. Background
The information-theoretical foundation of physical layer
security was laid down by Shannon’s definition of perfect
secrecy in [5]. Based on [5], [6] introduced the wiretap channel
model as a basic framework for physical layer security. The
results in [6] were subsequently generalized to the broadcast
channel and the Gaussian channel in [7] and [8], respectively.
These early studies revealed that if the eavesdropper’s obser-
vation is a degraded version of the legitimate user’s observa-
tion, it is possible to provide information-theoretically secure
communication between the legitimate users while keeping the
eavesdropper completely ignorant of secure messages.
A key assumption underpinning the information-theoretical
contributions in [6]–[8] is that perfect channel state informa-
tion (CSI) from both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdrop-
per is available at the transmitter. However, this assumption
may not be realistic since the uncertainty in CSI is a common
factor that affects the performance of practical communication
systems. In particular, if the eavesdropper is a passive user,
knowing the CSI from the eavesdropper is almost impossible.
Moreover, the perfect knowledge of the legitimate user’s
channel may not be easy to obtain at the transmitter in practice,
due to the limitations incurred by signal processing techniques
such as channel estimation errors, finite-rate feedback links,
and outdated CSI (or delayed CSI).
Against this background, a growing body of research efforts
have recently been devoted to examining the impact of imper-
fect CSI on physical layer security. Considering the practical
passive eavesdropping scenario, [9]–[13] proposed transmit
antenna selection schemes to enhance security in wiretap
channels. Considering Gaussian-distributed errors produced by
imperfect channel estimation at the legitimate receiver, [14]–
[19] designed secure transmission schemes and investigated
the achievable performance. It is worth mentioning that [19]
successfully introduced on-off design to develop fixed-rate
and variable-rate secure transmission schemes in the presence
of channel estimation errors. Considering limited feedback
constraints, [20]–[24] characterized the secrecy performance
in multi-antenna systems and studied the optimal power al-
location applied in artificial-noise-aided beamforming. Note
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that [24] also adopted on-off design to develop the optimized
artificial-noise-aided transmission scheme in limited feedback
channels. Although [9]–[24] have developed signal process-
ing techniques with passive eavesdropping, imperfect channel
estimation and limited feedback constraints, the models and
methods used in these papers cannot be used to address another
practical environment where imperfect CSI is caused by the
time delay of feedback link. This motivates us to develop new
models and methods for physical layer security with outdated
CSI.
B. Motivation
Outdated CSI is a practical contributor to the uncertainty
of channel knowledge at communication nodes. In a practical
system with feedback delay from the receiver to the transmit-
ter, the CSI obtained at the transmitter may be an outdated
version of the actual CSI. As such, the obtained CSI cannot
be directly used for secure transmission. Along this line there
are limited studies in the literature [25], [26]. Specifically, [25]
derived an upper bound on the secrecy rate loss by exploiting
the Gauss-Markov fading spectrum to model the feedback
delay, while [26] analyzed the effects of outdated CSI on
the secrecy outage performance of multi-input single-output
wiretap channels with transmit antenna selection. Notably,
[25], [26] merely concentrated on the secrecy performance
analysis, but have not presented detailed transmission design
in the presence of outdated CSI.
It is well to be reminded that although the outdated CSI
is not equivalent to the actual CSI, the temporal correlation
between outdated CSI and actual CSI makes it possible for the
transmitter to exploit some knowledge offered by the outdated
CSI to perform secure transmission. Therefore, there arises a
significant problem to be addressed: “how can we take advan-
tage of this benefit to design secure transmission schemes?”
Recall that the on-off design, as an efficient approach that
guarantees transmission quality, has been successfully used
to develop transmission schemes in the presence of channel
estimation errors [19] and limited feedback constraints [24],
respectively. Motivated by this, in this work we adopt the
on-off design to develop secure transmission schemes in the
presence of outdated CSI.
C. Contributions
We develop new secure transmission schemes in the pres-
ence of outdated CSI by using on-off design to exploit the
useful information existed in the outdated CSI. These schemes
are designed for two distinct scenarios, depending on whether
or not the eavesdropper is a legitimate user served by the
transmitter. In Scenario 1, the eavesdropper is an active user
(but not the intended receiver) and the outdated CSI from both
the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper is available at the
transmitter. In Scenario 2, the eavesdropper is not a legitimate
user and only the outdated CSI from the legitimate receiver is
available at the transmitter. The on-off design adopted in our
developed schemes allows transmission only when the channel
qualities known at the transmitter satisfy some predetermined
requirements [19], [24], [27], [28]. The rationale behind the
on-off design is that transmission should be avoided when the
quality of the intended receiver’s channel is poor or the quality
of the eavesdropper’s channel is strong.
Our primary contributions are summarized as follows:
 We design new on-off transmission schemes in the pres-
ence of outdated CSI and then derive new closed-form
expressions for the connection outage probability, the
secrecy outage probability, and the reliable and secure
transmission probability to quantify the achievable per-
formance. Different from [19], [24], [28], for the first
time we incorporate the reliable and secure transmis-
sion probability into the formulation of the throughput,
forming the secrecy throughput. Notably, the secrecy
throughput measures the average rate of the message
which is successfully decoded at the legitimate receiver
while being kept confidential to the eavesdropper.
 We determine new rate selection strategies that exploit the
useful information existed in the outdated CSI. In these
strategies, the codeword transmission rate is adaptively
designed according to the feedback from the legitimate
receiver. The secrecy rate is optimally selected to max-
imize the secrecy throughput subject to the constraints
on the connection outage probability and secrecy outage
probability. We present the optimal design for both Sce-
nario 1 and Scenario 2.
 We reach an important conclusion that allowing more
freedom on the codeword transmission rate enables the
enhancement of the reliability level by exploiting the
trade-off between reliability and security, since the code-
word transmission rate without optimization leads to the
poor reliability performance. We further show that this
trade-off provides us with a profound extension in the
feasible region of reliability constraint.
D. Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II details the outdated CSI model, the on-off transmission
schemes and the wiretap codes design in wiretap channels.
In Section III, we derive the exact expressions for the per-
formance metrics and offer numerical results to investigate
the secrecy performance. In Section IV, the optimized secrecy
rates for each scenario are presented, and the illustrative nu-
merical results are provided. Some discussions and concluding
remarks are provided in Sections V and VI, respectively.
II. SECURE TRANSMISSION IN THE PRESENCE OF
OUTDATED CSI
We consider a wiretap channel where the message transmit-
ted from a source Alice to a destination Bob is intercepted by
an eavesdropper Eve. We assume that Alice, Bob, and Eve are
equipped with a single antenna each. Throughout this paper,
we refer to the Alice-Bob channel as the main channel and
refer to the Alice-Eve channel as the eavesdropper’s channel.
We assume that both channels are subject to Rayleigh fading.
We also assume independent but non-identical distributions
between the main channel and the eavesdropper’s channel such
that they have different average signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs).
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Prior to data transmission, Alice requests Bob to feed back
his instantaneous channel quality by sending pilot signals.
Aided by the pilot signals, Bob estimates the main channel
coefficient, hb, and calculates the instantaneous received SNR
as b = Pbjhbj2=2b , where Pb and 2b denote the average
received signal power at Bob and the additive white Gaus-
sian noise (AWGN) power at Bob, respectively; while Eve
estimates the eavesdropper’s channel coefficient, he, and cal-
culates the instantaneous received SNR as e = Pejhej2=2e ,
where Pe and 2e denote the average received signal power at
Eve and the AWGN power at Eve, respectively. Then Bob
feeds back b to Alice to facilitate wiretap codes design.
Whether or not Eve feeds back e depends on whether or not
Eve is an active user of the network. Specifically, we consider
two scenarios based on the availability of e in this work, as
follows:
 Scenario 1: Eve is a non-passive eavesdropper such that
e is fed back to Alice. This scenario represents the case
where Eve is an active user of the network but is treated
as a malicious eavesdropper when Alice performs secure
transmission to Bob [29]–[31].
 Scenario 2: Eve is a passive eavesdropper such that e is
not fed back to Alice. This scenario represents the case
where Eve is an illegitimate user of the network [9]–[13].
We clarify that in both scenarios Eve is a regular user
served by Alice and thus Eve’s distance from Alice is known
and the path loss exponent is known. That is, Alice always
knows the average received SNR at Eve, e. Based on the
feedback information, Alice calculates the instantaneous chan-
nel capacity of the main channel during pilot transmission as
Cb = log2 (1 + b). Moreover, in Scenario 1 Alice calculates
the instantaneous channel capacity of the eavesdropper’s chan-
nel capacity as Ce = log2 (1 + e); while in Scenario 2 Alice
calculates the average channel capacity of the eavesdropper’s
channel capacity as Ce = log2 (1 + e). Then Alice adaptively
designs the wiretap codes based on Cb and Ce in Scenario 1
but based on Cb and Ce in Scenario 2.
A. Outdated CSI
In this work, we concentrate on the practical wiretap channel
where the CSI obtained at Alice is outdated. In the practice,
the process of acquiring CSI at the transmitter may take
a significant time duration for pilot transmission, channel
estimation, and CSI feedback. This results in the fact that the
channel coefficients during data transmission are not hb and
he. As such, the CSI obtained at Alice is an imprecise version
of the actual CSI, which causes the uncertainty in channel
quality.
We first describe the uncertainty in the channel knowledge
obtained at Alice in the wiretap channel. We define ~hb and
~he as the d time-delayed versions of hb and he, respectively.
Using a Gauss-Markov process [32], we formulate ~hb and ~he
as
~hb = bhb +
q
1  2bwb (1)
and
~he = ehe +
p
1  2ewe; (2)
respectively, where wb  CN (0; 1) and we  CN (0; 1)
are the channel-independent errors in the main channel and
the eavesdropper’s channel, respectively. Here, b denotes the
correlation coefficient between ~hb and hb, while e denotes
the correlation coefficient between ~he and he. In the Clark’s
fading model, b and e can be expressed as b = J0(2fbd)
and e = J0(2fed), where J0() is the zeroth-order Bessel
function of the first kind, fb and fe are the maximum Doppler
frequencies at Bob and Eve, respectively. In the Gaussian fad-
ing model, b and e can be expressed as b = exp( 2f2b 2d )
and e = exp( 2f2e 2d ), from which we find that b and e
degrade monotonically to zero as d increases. Since the Jakes
model is widely adopted in the existing studies on mobile
radios [32], in this work we use this model to perform the
simulations in Section III-C, Section IV-C and Section V.
Therefore, the received signals at Bob and Eve during data
transmission are given by
yb = ~hb
p
Pbx+nb =

bhb+
q
1 2bwb
p
Pbx+nb (3)
and
ye = ~he
p
Pex+ne =

ehe+
p
1 2ewe
p
Pex+ne; (4)
respectively, where nb  CN
 
0; 2b

and ne  CN
 
0; 2e

denote the AWGN at Bob and Eve, respectively. Based on
(3) and (4), the instantaneous SNRs at Bob and Eve dur-
ing data transmission are given by ~b = j~hbj2Pb=2b and
~e = j~hej2Pe=2e , respectively. Of course, ~b and ~e cannot
be obtained at Alice.
B. On-Off Schemes and Performance Metrics
We adopt Wyner’s encoding strategy [6] for secure transmis-
sion in the presence of outdated CSI. Before each transmission
block, Alice needs to choose two rate parameters for wiretap
codes design, i.e., the codeword transmission rate, Rb, and
the secrecy rate, Rs. The rate redundancy, Rb  Rs, provides
secrecy against eavesdropping. We clarify that Rb and Rs hold
constant over the duration of a block. In this work we use on-
off schemes for Scenario 1 and Scenario 2, as done in [19],
[28], which are detailed as follows:
 On-off scheme for Scenario 1: Based on the feedback
from Bob and Eve, Alice obtains the channel capacity
of the main channel, Cb, and the channel capacity of
the eavesdropper’s channel Ce. As such, Alice uses
Cb and Ce to design wiretap codes and performs data
transmission only when Cb   Ce > Rs.
 On-off scheme for Scenario 2: Based on the feedback
from Bob, Alice only obtains Cb. By aid of the statistic
knowledge of the eavesdropper’s channel, Alice uses
Cb and Ce to design wiretap codes and performs data
transmission only when Cb   Ce > Rs.
It is worthwhile to note that perfect connection and perfect
secrecy between Alice and Bob cannot be guaranteed in
the presence of outdated CSI for both cases. This is due
to the uncertainty in channel knowledge, i.e., Alice has no
knowledge of the actual main channel capacity given by
~Cb = log2 (1 + ~b) and the actual eavesdropper’s channel
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capacity given by ~Ce = log2 (1 + ~e). As such, the connection
outage occurs when ~Cb < Rb, in which Bob is unable to
decode the received codewords correctly. Mathematically, the
connection outage probability, pco, is defined as [19, Eq. (16)]
pco = Pr
n
~Cb < Rb jtransmission
o
: (5)
Moreover, the secrecy outage occurs when Rb   Rs < ~Ce.
Mathematically, the secrecy outage probability, pso, is defined
as [19, Eq. (15)]
pso = Pr
n
Rb  Rs < ~Ce jtransmission
o
: (6)
Note that both outage probabilities are conditioned upon a
message being transmitted. These outage probabilities are of
practical importance since the reliability level and the security
level can be measured using these probabilities when the
outdated CSI is in presence. However, from (5) and (6) we find
that the connection outage event and the secrecy outage event
are definitely not independent from each other, but related with
Rb. To evaluate the combination of reliability and security,
we resort to the successful (reliable and secure) transmission
probability, prst, which is defined as
prst = Pr
n
~Cb  Rb; Rb  Rs  ~Ce jtransmission
o
: (7)
Notably, (7) is a novel formulation to characterize the relia-
bility and security levels of transmission.
C. Rate Selection Strategy
To exploit the useful knowledge existing in the outdated
CSI, the strategy for the choice of Rb and Rs is explained as
following: Rb is adaptively designed according to the feedback
from the legitimate receiver, while Rs is optimally chosen and
keeps constant over the transmission block. In other words, this
is an adaptive-codeword-transmission-rate but fixed-secrecy-
rate strategy. Since Cb is the only knowledge obtained from
Bob, it is convenient and natural for Alice to set Rb = Cb to
guarantee maximum rate redundancy against eavesdropping.
This leads to the fact that Rs is the only controllable parameter
in the wiretap codes design. As such, Rs is optimally chosen
before data transmission and then kept constant during data
transmission.
The aim of our design is to achieve the optimal secrecy
throughput under the constraints of two outage probabilities.
Here, the secrecy throughput, , is defined as
 = ptxprstRs; (8)
where ptx denotes the transmission probability and prst is
given by (7). We highlight that the secrecy throughput in
(8) is different from the throughput in [19], defined as
ptx (1  pco)Rs. In (8), we introduce prst into the formulation
of the secrecy throughput. We clarify that the incorporation
of prst is reasonable and necessary for the assessment and
improvement of reliability and security. Specifically, prst
jointly quantizes the reliability level and the security level of
the secrecy throughput.
Using (8), our design aim is formulated as
max
Rs
;
subject to pco  ; pso  ; (9)
where  denotes the reliability constraint and  denotes the
security constraint. Note that solving the optimized Rs in
(9) can help us not only obtain good secrecy throughput
performance but keep the reliability and security levels under
control.
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE WITH ON-OFF
TRANSMISSION SCHEMES
In this section, we analyze the secrecy performance for
the two scenarios presented in Section II-B by exploiting
the on-off transmission schemes. Specifically, we derive the
closed-form expressions for the connection outage probability,
the secrecy outage probability as well as the reliable and
secure transmission probability defined in Section II-B. We
then present the numerical results to examine the performance
of the on-off transmission schemes with outdated CSI.
A. Performance Analysis for Scenario 1
In this subsection, we consider Scenario 1 and derive
new expressions for the connection outage probability, the
secrecy outage probability, the reliable and secure transmission
probability. We then present the feasibility of the reliability
constraint and the security constraint as well.
1) ptx1 (Rs), pco1 (Rs), pso1 (Rs) and prst1 (Rs): In Sce-
nario 1, Alice sets Rb = Cb and performs data transmission
only when Cb   Ce  Rs. The transmission probability in
Scenario 1 is derived as
ptx1 (Rs) = Pr fCb   Ce  Rsg
= Pr

b  2Rs (1 + e)  1
	
=
Z 1
0
fe (e)
 Z 1
2Rs (1+e) 1
fb (b) db
!
de
=
b
b + 2Rse
exp

 2
Rs   1
b

: (10)
We note that (10) can be obtained by using the probability
density functions (PDFs) of b and e. In this work, we
assume that both the main channel and the eavesdropper’s
channel are subject to Rayleigh fading, such that the PDF
of b is fb (b) = exp ( b=b) =b and the PDF of e is
fe (e) = exp ( e=e) =e [19], where b = E

h2b

Pb=
2
b
denotes the average SNR at Bob and e = E

h2e

Pe=
2
e
denotes the average SNR at Eve.
The connection outage occurs when ~Cb < Cb. As such, the
connection outage probability in Scenario 1 is given by
pco1 (Rs) = Pr
n
~Cb < Cb jCb   Ce  Rs
o
: (11)
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Based on the cumulative density distribution (CDF) of a non-
central chi-square distributed variable, we derive pco1 (Rs) as
pco1 (Rs) =1 
b + 2
Rse
b
exp
 
 
 
1 + 2b
  
2Rs   1
(1  2b) b
!

1X
n=0
1X
k=0

2(n+k)
b
 
1  2b

  (n+ 2k + 1)
k!2n+2k+1  (n+ k + 1)

n+2kX
m=0
mX
q=0
 
2Rs   1m q2m+qRs
(m  q)!((1  2b) b)me

  
1  2b

be
(1  2b) b + 2Rs+1e
!q+1
; (12)
where   () is the Gamma function defined in [33, Eq.
(8.310.1)]. The proof is given in Appendix A.
The secrecy outage occurs when Cb   Rs < ~Ce. As such,
the secrecy outage probability in Scenario 1 is given by
pso1 (Rs) = Pr
n
Cb  Rs < ~Ce jCb   Ce  Rs
o
: (13)
We derive pso1 (Rs) as
pso1 (Rs) =
b + 2
Rse
b
exp

2Rs   1
b

(`1   `2) ; (14)
where `1 is
`1 =exp

  2
 Rs   1
(1  2e) e
 1X
n=0
1X
k=0

2(n+k)
e
 
1 2e

  (k+1) ((1 2e) e)k

kX
q=0

k
q
 
1 2Rsk q
2kRsb
  
1 2e

2Rsbe
b + (1 2e) 2Rse
!q+1
  
 
q + 1;
b +
 
1  2e

2Rse
(1  2e) 2Rsbe
 
2Rs   1! ; (15)
`2 is
`2 =exp

  2
1 Rs   2
(1  2e) e
 1X
n=0
1X
k=0

2(n+k)
e
 
1  2e

k!((1  2e) e)k

n+kX
m=0
k+mX
q=0

k +m
q
 
2 Rs   1k+m q2 qRs
m!((1  2e) e)mb
  
 
q + 1;
21 Rsb +
 
1 2e

e
(1 2e) be
 
2Rs 1!

  
1  2e

be
21 Rsb + (1  2e) e
!q+1
; (16)
and   (; ) is the incomplete Gamma function defined in [33,
Eq. (8.352.2)]. The proof is given in Appendix B.
The successful transmission occurs when both ~Cb  Cb
and Cb  Rs  ~Ce are satisfied simultaneously. As such, the
reliable and secure transmission probability in Scenario 1 is
given by
prst1 (Rs) = Pr
n
~Cb  Cb; Cb Rs  ~Ce jCb Ce  Rs
o
:
(17)
We derive prst1 (Rs) as
prst1 (Rs) =
b + 2
Rse
b
exp

2Rs   1
b

(`3   `4   `5) ;
(18)
where `3 is
`3 =
1X
n=0
1X
k=0

2(n+k)
b
 
1  2b

  (k + 1)  (n+ k + 1) 2n+2k+1
  
 
n+ 2k + 1;
2
 
2Rs   1
(1  2b) b
!
; (19)
`4 is
`4 =exp

 2
 Rs   1
e
 1X
n=0
1X
k=0

2(n+k)
b
 
1  2b

  (k + 1)  (n+ k + 1)
  
 
n+ 2k + 1;
 
2Rs+1e +
 
1  2b

b

(2Rs   1) 1 (1  2b) 2Rsbe
!


2Rse
2Rs+1e + (1  2b) b
n+2k+1
; (20)
and `5 = `6  `7, where `6 and `7 are given at the top of next
page. The proof is given in Appendix C.
Remark 1:We clarify that the connection outage probability
is merely affected by b, as indicated by (12), and the secrecy
outage probability is merely affected by e, as indicated by
(14). This reveals that in Scenario 1, the reliability level
depends on the outdated CSI of the main channel, while the
security level depends on the outdated CSI of the eavesdrop-
per’s channel.
2) Feasibility of Constraints: We now investigate the fea-
sibility of the reliability constraint and the security constraint.
Using the mathematical software package to take the first
derivative of pco1 (Rs) in (12), we find that pco1 (Rs) is an
increasing function of Rs. When Rs ! 0, pco1 (Rs) achieves
its lower bound, pco1;LB . We obtain pco1;LB as
pco1;LB =1 
1X
n=0
1X
k=0

2(n+k)
b   (n+ 2k + 1)
  (k + 1)  (n+ k + 1) 2n+2k+1

n+2kX
m=0
 
1  2b
2
(b + e) 2
mme
(2e + (1  2b) b)m+1
: (23)
As such, the feasible range of the reliability constraint in
Scenario 1 is given by
pco1;LB <   1: (24)
We then take the first derivative of pso1 (Rs) in (14) and
find that pso1 (Rs) is also an increasing function of Rs. When
Rs ! 0, pso1 (Rs) achieves its lower bound, pso1;LB . We
obtain pso1;LB as
pso1;LB =
b + e
b
1X
n=0
1X
k=0
 

2(n+k)
e
 
1  2e
2
e
k
b
(b + (1  2e) e)k+1
 
n+kX
m=0

m+ k
m


2(n+k)
e
 
1  2e
2
e
m+k
b
(2b + (1  2e) e)m+k+1
!
:
(25)
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`6 =exp

  2
 Rs   1
(1  2e) e
 1X
n=0
1X
k=0
1X
s=0
1X
t=0

2(n+k)
b 
2(s+t)
e
 
1  2b
  
1  2e
   
1  2e

e
n+2k t+1
k!  (n+ k + 1) t!(2 (1  2e) e + 2 Rs (1  2b) b)n+2k+1
tX
q=0
t!
 
2 Rs   1t q
q! (t  q)!

 
2 Rs
 
1  2b
  
1  2e

be
2 (1  2e) e + 2 Rs (1  2b) b
!q
 
 
n+2k+q+1;
2
 
1  2e

e + 2
 Rs  1  2b b
(2Rs   1) 1 (1  2b) (1  2e) be
!
; (21)
`7 =exp

  2
1 Rs   2
(1  2e) e
 1X
n=0
1X
k=0
1X
s=0
1X
t=0

2(n+k)
b 
2(s+t)
e
 
1  2b
  
1  2e

(2 (1  2e) e + 21 Rs (1  2b) b)n+2k+1
s+tX
m=0
t+mX
q=0
  
1  2e

e
n+2k t m+1
  (n+ k + 1) (t+m  q)!

 
2 Rs   1t+m q
((t+m)!)
 1
k!t!m!q!
 
2 Rs
 
1  2b
  
1  2e

be
2 (1  2e) e + 21 Rs (1  2b) b
!q
 
 
n+2k+q+1;
2
 
1  2e

e + 2
1 Rs  1  2b b
(2Rs   1) 1 (1  2b) (1  2e) be
!
:
(22)
Accordingly, we obtain the feasible range of the security
constraint in Scenario 1 as
pso1;LB <   1: (26)
We highlight that in Scenario 1 the reliability constraint and
the security constraint are feasible only when (24) and (26)
are satisfied.
B. Performance Analysis for Scenario 2
In this subsection, we concentrate on Scenario 2. New
closed-form expressions are derived for the transmission prob-
ability, connection outage probability, secrecy outage proba-
bility, reliable and secure transmission probability, based on
which we evaluate the feasibility of the reliability and security
constraints.
1) ptx2 (Rs), pco2 (Rs), pso2 (Rs), and prst2 (Rs): In Sce-
nario 2, Alice has no knowledge of Ce. As such, Alice
sets Rb = Cb and performs secure transmission only when
Cb   Ce  Rs. The transmission probability in Scenario 2 is
derived as
ptx2 (Rs) = Pr

Cb   Ce  Rs
	
= Pr

b  2Rs (1 + e)  1
	
=
Z 1
2Rs (1+e) 1
fb (b) db
= exp

 2
Rs (1 + e)  1
b

: (27)
The connection outage probability in Scenario 2 is given by
pco2 (Rs) = Pr
n
~Cb < Cb
Cb   Ce  Rso : (28)
Applying the CDF of a non-central chi-square distributed
variable, pco2 (Rs) is derived as
pco2 (Rs) =1 exp

2Rs (1 + e)  1
b
 1X
n=0
1X
k=0
1
  (k + 1)
  

n+ 2k + 1;
2Rs+1 (1 + e)  2
(1  2b) b



1
2
n+2k+1 2(n+k)b  1  2b
  (n+ k + 1)
: (29)
The secrecy outage probability in Scenario 2 is given by
pso2 (Rs) = Pr
n
Cb  Rs < ~Ce
Cb   Ce  Rso : (30)
Using the statistics of b and ~e, we derive pso2 (Rs) as
pso2 (Rs) =
2Rseexp ( 1)
2Rse + b
: (31)
The reliable and secure transmission probability in Scenario
2 is given by
prst2 (Rs) = Pr
n
~Cb  Cb; Cb Rs  ~Ce
Cb   Ce  Rso :
(32)
We derive prst2 (Rs) as
prst2 (Rs) = exp

2Rs (1 + e)  1
b

(`8   `9) ; (33)
where `8 is
`8 =
1X
n=0
1X
k=0

2(n+k)
b
 
1  2b

  (k + 1)  (n+ k + 1)

1
2
n+2k+1
  
 
n+ 2k + 1;
2
 
2Rs+1 (1 + e)  2

(1  2b) b
!
; (34)
and `9 is
`9 =exp

 2
 Rs   1
e
 1X
n=0
1X
k=0

2(n+k)
b
 
1  2b

  (k + 1)  (n+ k + 1)
  
 
n+2k+1;
 
2Rs+1e+
 
1 2b

b

(be)
 1
(2Rs (1 + e)  1) 12Rs (1 2b)
!


2Rse
2Rs+1e + (1  2b) b
n+2k+1
: (35)
Remark 2: Based on (29) and (31), we find that the
connection outage probability is only affected by b but the
secrecy outage probability is not influenced by either b or
e. This reveals that in Scenario 2 the outdated CSI only
influences the reliability level.
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2) Feasibility of Constraints: We next examine the feasi-
bility of the reliability constraint and the security constraint.
Using the mathematical software package to take the first-
order derivative of pco2 (Rs) in (29), we find that pco2 (Rs)
is an increasing function of Rs. When Rs ! 0, pco2 (Rs)
achieves its lower bound, pco2;LB , which is derived as
pco2;LB =1 exp

e
b
 1X
n=0
1X
k=0
2(n+k)
 
1  2
  (k + 1)  (n+ k + 1)


1
2
n+2k+1
 

n+ 2k + 1;
2e
(1  2) b

:
(36)
Therefore, the feasible range of the reliability constraint in
Scenario 2 is given by
pco2;LB <   1: (37)
Next, by observing (31) we see that pso2 (Rs) is also an
increasing function of Rs. When Rs ! 0, pso2 (Rs) achieves
its lower bound, pso2;LB , given by
pso2;LB =
eexp ( 1)
e + b
: (38)
Thus, the feasible range of the security constraint in Scenario
2 is obtained as
pso2;LB <   1: (39)
It is worthwhile to note that in Scenario 2 the reliability
constraint and the security constraint are feasible only when
(37) and (39) are satisfied.
C. Numerical Results
We present numerical results in this subsection to examine
the performance of the on-off transmission schemes. We
clarify that the infinitive summations in our derived closed-
form expressions can be perfectly approximated with finite
summations (usually first 10 terms in the summations give
an accurate approximation). The simulation settings are as
follows, unless specified otherwise: The average received SNR
at Bob is assumed to be Pb=2b = 10 dB, while the average
received SNR at Eve is assumed to be Pe=2e = 0 dB.
In each simulation trial, the main channel coefficient and
the eavesdropper’s channel coefficient are randomly gener-
ated using an i.i.d. complex Gaussian distribution with zero
mean and unit variance. The temporal correlation parameters
of the two channel coefficients are assumed to follow the
Clarke’s model and are characterized by b = J0(2fbd) and
e = J0(2fed), respectively. All the results to be shown are
averaged over 10,000 channel trials. It is evident from Figs. 1,
2 and 3 that the Monte Carlo simulation points, marked by ‘’,
match precisely with the analytical curves, which demonstrates
the accuracy of our analysis.
Fig. 1 plots the connection outage probability versus Rs
for two scenarios with different values of b. In this figure,
pco1 (Rs) and pco2 (Rs) are generated from (12) and (29),
respectively. We first observe that pco1 (Rs) and pco2 (Rs)
increase with Rs. This is due to the fact that an increasing
Rs requires a higher Cb to satisfy the transmission condition.
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pco1 , ρb = 0.8
Simulation
pco2 for Scenario 2
pco1 for Scenario 1
Fig. 1. Connection outage probability versus Rs with outdated CSI for b =
10 dB and e = 0 dB.
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pso2 for Scenario 2
Fig. 2. Secrecy outage probability versus Rs with outdated CSI for b = 10
dB and e = 0 dB.
Notably, a higher Cb leads to a higher probability that ~Cb is
lower than Cb, due to the characteristics of Gauss-Markov
process. Second, we observe that pco1 (Rs) and pco2 (Rs)
increase when b decreases. This observation is not surprising
since the uncertainty in the main channel quality increases as
b decreases, which results in a poorer reliability. Third, we
observe that pco2 (Rs) is higher than pco1 (Rs) for the same
b. This is due to the fact that the transmission condition in
Scenario 2, Cb  Ce + Rs, is stricter than that in Scenario
1, Cb  Ce + Rs. Thus, a higher Cb is required in Scenario
2, which results in the worse reliability. Fourth, we observe
that both pco1 (Rs) and pco2 (Rs) are always greater than 0.5,
which implies that the reliability constraint should be loose in
the on-off transmission schemes.
Fig. 2 plots the secrecy outage probability versus Rs for two
scenarios with different values of e. In this figure, pso1 (Rs)
and pso2 (Rs) are generated from (14) and (31), respectively.
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Fig. 3. Reliable and secure transmission probability versus Rs with outdated
CSI for b = 10 dB and e = 0 dB.
First, we observe that pso1 (Rs) and pso2 (Rs) increase as Rs
increases. This is due to the fact that the rate redundancy,
Cb   Rs, decreases with Rs and a lower rate redundancy
leads to a higher probability that ~Ce is higher than the rate
redundancy. We then find that pso2 (Rs) is not influenced
by the value of e and different behavior of pso1 (Rs) is
observed depending on the value of e, as indicated by (31).
When e is not sufficiently high (e.g. e  0:5), pso1 (Rs) is
always higher than pso2 (Rs); however, when e is sufficiently
high (e.g. e > 0:9), the opposite happens. From a design
perspective, this observation implies that Ce should be used
for transmission design only when e is high; otherwise
directly using Ce is a better choice for security enhancement.
Moreover, we find that pso1 (Rs) and pso2 (Rs) are smaller
than 0.1 for low Rs, which implies that the security constraint
can be sufficiently strict in the on-off transmission schemes.
Fig. 3 plots the reliable and secrecy transmission probability
versus Rs for two scenarios with different values of b and e.
In this figure, prst1 (Rs) and prst2 (Rs) are generated from
(18) and (33), respectively. We first observe that prst1 (Rs)
and prst2 (Rs) decrease as Rs increases. This is due to the
fact that increasing Rs strengthens the transmission condition
(requiring higher Cb), which leads to a lower probability that
~Cb is higher than Cb while the rate redundancy is higher than
~Ce. We also observe that prst1 (Rs) and prst2 (Rs) decrease
when b decreases. Moreover, for a fixed b in Scenario 1,
prst1 (Rs) also decreases when e decreases. This is because
that the uncertainty in the main and eavesdropper’s channel
quality increases as b and e decrease, which results in poorer
reliability and security levels. Furthermore, we observe that for
a fixed b, when e is high (e.g. e = 0:8), prst1 (Rs) is higher
than prst2 (Rs); but when e is low (e.g. e = 0:5), prst1 (Rs)
is lower than prst2 (Rs). This observation demonstrates that
in terms of the reliable and secrecy transmission probability,
a sufficiently high e is required to guarantee that Scenario 1
performs better than Scenario 2.
Fig. 4 plots the reliable and secure transmission probability
0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.050.2
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0.3
0.35
0.4
τd (s)
p
r
s
t 1
Rs = 1.0
Rs = 1.5
Rs = 2.0
Fig. 4. Reliable and secure transmission probability versus d for b = 10
dB, e = 0 dB, vb = ve = 30 km/h and fc = 900 MHz in Scenario 1.
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Fig. 5. Feasible security constraint versus feasible reliability constraint with
outdated CSI for b = 10 dB and e = 0 dB.
versus d for Scenario 1 with different values of Rs. The
correlation coefficients are generated by the Clark’s fading
model with vb = ve = 30 km/h and fc = 900 MHz. We first
observe that prst1 (Rs) is not a monotony decrease function of
d. In particular, we find that prst1 (Rs) decreases fast before
d increases to 10 ms. However, when d is sufficiently large,
i.e., d > 10 ms, prst1 (Rs) starts to fluctuate around a certain
value and does not decrease further. This observation is not
surprising since the absolute values of b and e, generated
by the Clark’s fading model, fluctuate in the large delay
regime. Moreover, we observe that for a fixed d, prst1 (Rs)
decreases as Rs increases, which has been explained in the
descriptions of Fig. 3. Similarly, we conclude that prst2 (Rs)
versus d for Scenario 2 has a similar conclusion. The detailed
illustrations for Scenario 2 are omitted in this subsection to
avoid redundancy.
Fig. 5 plots the feasible security constraint versus the
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feasible reliability constraint for both scenarios. In this figure,
pco1;LB , pso1;LB , pco2;LB , and pso2;LB are generated from
(23), (25), (36), and (38), respectively. For each scenario with
specifical b and e (only e in Scenario 2), the feasible
region of  and  lies in the region above the corresponding
curve. First, we observe that in both Scenario 1 and Scenario
2 increasing b leads to the extension of the feasible region.
Second, we observe that the feasible region in Scenario 2 is not
influenced by e; while in Scenario 1 we observe the extension
in the feasible region when e increases. Third, we observe
that for the same b, Scenario 1 enables higher reliability
level than Scenario 2. However, in terms of the security level,
whether Scenario 1 performs better or not depends on the
value of e. In particular, Scenario 1 enables higher security
level when e is high (e.g. e = 0:8); while Scenario 2 enables
higher security level when e is low(e.g. e = 0:5). Fourth,
we observe that the feasible regions are strictly restricted at
the right side of  = 0:5, which implies that this transmission
design ignores the system reliability and can be only applied
for the systems where the reliability is not seen as important.
IV. SECURE TRANSMISSION DESIGN
In this section, we first investigate the optimal solutions for
Rs meeting (9) for each scenario, based on which we then
present numerical results to investigate the impact of the dual
outage constraints on the secrecy throughput in both scenarios.
A. Optimized Rs for Scenario 1
In Scenario 1, the secrecy throughput is given by
1 (Rs) = ptx1 (Rs) prst1 (Rs)Rs: (40)
Mathematically, we express S1 as
S1 = argmax
Rs
1 (Rs) : (41)
Using the mathematical software package to take the first-
order derivative of 1 (Rs) with respect to Rs, we find
that @1 (Rs)=@Rs is first positive and then negative, which
confirms that without dual outage constraints there is a unique
solution to S1, which achieves the maximum 1 (Rs).
Based on the feasibility for the dual outage constraints
presented in (24) and (26), we express S2 and S3 as
S2 = fRs jpco1 (Rs) = g ; (42)
and
S3 = fRs jpso1 (Rs) =  g ; (43)
respectively. As mentioned in Section III-A, both pco1 (Rs)
and pso1 (Rs) are monotonous increasing functions of Rs,
which guarantees that both (42) and (43) each have a unique
solution.
Although the closed-form solutions for S1, S2, and S3 are
mathematically intractable, we are able to obtain them using
a numerical method, e.g., bisection method. Based on above
results, we present the optimal Rs that meets (9) in Scenario
1 in the following proposition.
s
R
 
!
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Feasible Region
1S2S 3S
b).  Case 2
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!
0
" #sR$
s
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0
Fig. 6. Tho optimal Rs maximizing the secrecy throughput with dual outage
constraints.
Proposition 1: The optimal Rs that maximizes the secrecy
throughput in Scenario 1, subject to the connection and secrecy
constraints, is given by
Rs1 = min fS1; S2; S3g ; (44)
where S1, S2, and S3 are given by (41), (42), and (43),
respectively.
Proof: By solving (41), (42), and (43), the values of S1,
S2, and S3 can be obtained, as depicted in Fig. 6. For a given
 and , the optimized Rs must lie within not only the feasible
region determined by S2 but the feasible region determined by
S3. As such, the feasible region of Rs is S = [0;min fS2; S3g].
Based on S, we obtain the optimal Rs maximizing the secrecy
throughput with dual outage constraints in the following two
cases:
 If S1 < min fS2; S3g, as depicted in Fig. 6a), S1 lies
within the feasible region S. That is, the maximum
1 (Rs) is still available in the feasible region S, and S1
is the unique solution. Hence, we have Rs1 = S1. We
highlight that in this case the outage constraints impose
no effects on the optimal solution.
 If S1  min fS2; S3g, as depicted in Fig. 6b), S1 lies
beyond the feasible region S and cannot be treated as the
solution. Moreover, we find that 1 (Rs) is a monotonous
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increasing function of Rs in the feasible region S. As
such, we take Rs1 = min fS2; S3g to guarantee that the
highest secrecy throughput can be obtained.
To sum up the conclusions in the aforementioned two cases,
the optimal Rs maximizing the secrecy throughput with dual
outage constraints in (44) can be obtained.
B. Optimized Rs for Scenario 2
In Scenario 2, the secrecy throughput is given by
2 (Rs) = ptx2 (Rs) prst2 (Rs)Rs: (45)
Mathematically, we express T1 as
T1 = argmax
Rs
2 (Rs) : (46)
We first use the mathematical software package to take the
first-order derivative of 2 (Rs) with respect to Rs and find
that @2 (Rs)=@Rs is first positive and then negative. This
indicates that there is a unique value of Rs maximizing
2 (Rs) subject to no outage constraints. Hence we conclude
that (46) has a unique solution.
Based on the feasibility for the dual outage constraints
presented in (37) and (39), we express T2 and T3 as
T2 = fRs jpco2 (Rs) = g ; (47)
and
T3 = fRs jpso2 (Rs) =  g
=
(
log2

b
[exp( 1) ]e

;  < exp ( 1)
1;   exp ( 1);
(48)
respectively. As mentioned in Section III-B, pco2 (Rs) is a
monotonous increasing function of Rs, which implies that (47)
has a unique solution.
Despite that the closed-form solutions for T1 and T2 are
mathematically intractable, we are still able to obtain them
using a numerical method, e.g., bisection method. Based on
above results, we present the optimal Rs that meets (9) in
Scenario 2 in the following proposition.
Proposition 2: The optimal Rs that maximizes the secrecy
throughput in Scenario 2, subject to two constraints, is given
by
Rs2 = min fT1; T2; T3g ; (49)
where T1, T2, and T3 are given by (46), (47), and (48)
respectively.
Proof: The proof is similar with the proof for Proposition
1. Here we omit the detailed proving process for brevity.
C. Numerical Results
In this subsection, we present numerical results to in-
vestigate the impact of the dual outage constraints on the
secrecy throughput in each scenario. Since our analytical
results have been verified using Monte Carlo simulations in
Section III-C, the Monte Carlo simulation points are omitted
in this subsection to avoid unnecessarily cluttering.
Fig. 7 plots the secrecy throughput versus Rs for two
scenarios with different values of b and e. In this figure, we
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ρb = 0.8 for
Scenario 1&2
Fig. 7. Secrecy throughput subject to no outage constraints with outdated
CSI for b = 10 dB and e = 0 dB.
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Fig. 8. Secrecy throughput versus reliability constraint with outdated CSI for
b = e = 0:8, b = 10 dB and e = 0 dB.
generate 1 (Rs) and 2 (Rs) from (40) and (45), respectively.
Moreover, we do not consider the reliability and security
constraints such that  =  = 1. Moreover, we do not consider
the reliability and security constraints such that  =  = 1.
We first observe that the secrecy throughput first increases and
then decreases as Rs increases, indicating that an optimal Rs
indeed exists such that the secrecy throughput is maximized.
Thus we clarify that (41) and (46) each have a unique solution.
We also observe that the secrecy throughput decreases when
b or e decreases. Furthermore, we observe that for the same
b, the secrecy throughput in Scenario 1 is higher than that
in Scenario 2, even if e is fairly low (e.g. e = 0:3). This is
due to the fact that there is a higher probability to perform
transmission in Scenario 1 than that in Scenario 2. Thus
Scenario 1 offers a better secrecy throughput than Scenario
2 without the outage constraints.
Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 plot the secrecy throughput for two
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Fig. 9. Secrecy throughput versus security constraint with outdated CSI for
b = e = 0:8, b = 10 dB and e = 0dB.
scenarios versus the reliability constraint and the security
constraint, respectively. We first observe that the secrecy
throughput is a monotone non-decreasing function of either
constraint. We then see that a positive secrecy throughput is
achieved only when the two constraints are within the feasible
ranges. For example, in Fig. 8 a positive secrecy throughput
is achieved when 0:534 <   1 in Scenario 1 and when
0:541 <   1 in Scenario 2. Moreover, in Fig. 9 a positive
secrecy throughput is achieved when 0:027 <   1 in
Scenario 1 and when 0:034 <   1 in Scenario 2. Notably,
we find that in the specifical case with b = e = 0:8, Scenario
1 has a stricter security constraint and a stricter reliability
constraint than Scenario 2. Furthermore, we observe that a
constraint threshold exists such that the secrecy throughput
keeps constant after the constraint exceeds the threshold. For
example, it is seen from Fig. 8 and 9 that the maximum secrecy
throughput in Scenario 1 is achieved when   0:614 and
  0:081, and the maximum secrecy throughput in Scenario
2 is achieved when   0:624 and   0:086. This is due to
the fact that the optimal Rs can always be used to perform
data transmission with the same secrecy throughput when the
constraints are higher than the thresholds.
V. DISCUSSIONS
As seen in Section IV, Rs is the only controllable parameter
for transmission design. Our solutions of the optimal Rs allow
us to maximize the secrecy throughput subject to two con-
straints. We also note that the designed transmission schemes
forgo the reliability level, as seen in Fig. 5. This is due to
the fact that in the presence of the outdated CSI, the main
channel quality known at Alice tends to be higher than the
instantaneous channel capacity for secure transmission. As
such, this transmission design may not be suitable for the
systems where the reliability is in high demand. Motivated
by this, in this section we present some discussions about the
possible transmission design to improve reliability level.
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Fig. 10. Feasible security constraint versus feasible reliability constraint with
outdated CSI for b = 10 dB and e = 0 dB.
Based on the aforementioned reasons, we believe that the
use of Rb = Cb makes the quality of the main channel to be
overestimated. Thus it is wise for Alice to set Rb as
Rb = log2
 
2Rs + u
 
2Cb   2Rs ; (50)
where u 2 [0; 1]. Note that when u = 1 we have Rb = Cb,
and when u = 0 we have Rb = Rs. It is evident from (50)
that the value of Rb is within the feasible range of [Rs; Cb].
By applying (50) into the system model in Section II-B
and using the similar approaches in Section III, we can de-
rive the closed-form expressions of pco1 (u;Rs), pso1 (u;Rs),
pco2 (u;Rs) and pso2 (u;Rs). Thus the lower bounds on
these outage probabilities for a given u, such as pco1;LB (u),
pso1;LB (u), pco2;LB (u) and pso2;LB (u), can be obtained by
setting Rs = 0. Here the detailed derivations are omitted for
brevity. We then find that the choice of Rb, indicated by (50),
enables a trade-off between the feasible reliability constraint
and the feasible security constraint. For example, a lower Rb
leads to a lower connection outage probability but a higher
secrecy outage probability. This implies that if we set a looser
reliability constraint, the security constraint becomes stricter.
To illustrate this trade-off between the feasible reliability
constraint and the feasible security constraint, Fig. 10 plots
the new feasible region of the dual outage constraints for
both scenarios. In this figure, the curves are generated by
using the values of pco1;LB (u), pso1;LB (u), pco2;LB (u) and
pso2;LB (u) at all values of u. For each scenario with fixed
b and e, the feasible region of  and  lies in the region
above the corresponding curve. We first observe that when u
increases, the lower bound on the connection outage proba-
bility increases, but the lower bound on the secrecy outage
probability decreases. For example, in Scenario 2 when u
increases from 0 to 1, the lower bound on the connection
outage probability increases from 0 to pco2;LB , as indicated by
(36), while the lower bound on the secrecy outage probability
decreases from 1 to pso2;LB , as indicated by (38). This
observation is not surprising since allowing more freedom
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on Rb enables a trade-off between reliability and security.
Notably, this trade-off leads to a profound extension in the
feasible region compared with Fig. 5. We also observe the
extension of the feasible region when b or e increases, which
is due to that the uncertainty in the main channel and the
eavesdropper’s channel decreases when b and e increase,
respectively. This indicates that the more knowledge about
the channel quality is known at Alice, the better reliability
and security levels can be achieved.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the presence of outdated CSI, we adopted the on-off
scheme to help perform secure transmission, under which
we conducted the secrecy performance in wiretap channel
and then presented the design of wiretap coding parameters.
In particular, we considered the two scenarios with different
assumptions on the CSI from the eavesdropper. For each sce-
nario, we derived the transmission probability, the connection
outage probability, the secrecy outage probability as well as
the reliable and secure transmission probability. Based on
these results, we determined the optimal secrecy rates that
maximize the secrecy throughput under dual connection and
secrecy outage constraints. Moreover, we found that a larger
feasible region of the dual outage constraints can be obtained
by optimizing the codeword transmission rate.
APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF pco1 (Rs) IN (12)
Based on (11), we formulate pco1 (Rs) as
pco1 (Rs) = Pr
n
~Cb < Cb jCb   Ce  Rs
o
= Pr

~b < b
b  2Rs (1 + e)  1	
=
Pr

~b < b; b  2Rs (1 + e)  1
	
Pr fb  2Rs (1 + e)  1g : (51)
We first re-express the numerator of pco1 (Rs) as
Pr

~b < b; b  2Rs (1 + e)  1
	
=
Z 1
0
Z 1
2Rs (1+x) 1
Z y
0
f~bjb (z jy ) dz| {z }
1
fb (y) dy
| {z }
2
fe (x) dx:
(52)
Recall that ~b and b are two correlated exponential random
variables (RVs). The conditional PDF of ~b conditioned on a
given b is given by
f~bjb (z jy ) =
1
(1  2b) b
exp

  z + 
2
by
(1  2b) b

 I0

2b
p
zy
(1  2b) b

: (53)
Substituting (53) into 1, we derive 1 as
1 = 1 Q1
 s
22by
(1  2b) b
;
s
2y
(1  2b) b
!
; (54)
where Q1 (a; b) represents the Marcum’s Q-function [34]. We
then use the series representation of Marcum’s Q-function in
terms of Bessel functions, given by
Q1 (a; b) = exp

 a
2 + b2
2
 1X
n=0
a
b
n
In (ab); (55)
and the expansion of Bessel function [33, Eq. (8.445)], given
by
Iv (z) =
1X
k=0
1
k!  (v + k + 1)
z
2
v+2k
; (56)
to obtain the series representation of 1, which yields
1 =1  exp
 
 
 
1 + 2b

y
(1  2b) b
! 1X
n=0
1X
k=0

2(n+k)
b
k!
 1
  (n+ k + 1)

y
(1  2b) b
n+2k
: (57)
Substituting (57) into 2, we derive 2 as
2 =exp

 2
Rsx+ 2Rs   1
b

  exp
 
 2
 
2Rs   1
(1  2b) b
!
 exp

  2
1+Rsx
(1  2b) b
 1X
n=0
1X
k=0

2(n+k)
b
 
1  2b

k!2n+2k+1
 (n+ 2k)!
(n+ k)!
n+2kX
m=0
mX
q=0
 
2Rs   1m q2m+qRsxq
q! (m  q)!((1  2b) b)m
:
(58)
Substituting (58) into (52) and solve the resultant integrals,
the numerator of pco1 (Rs) is obtained. We also note that
the denominator of pco1 (Rs) is given by (10). Therefore, we
obtain pco1 (Rs) in (12).
APPENDIX B
DERIVATION OF pso1 (Rs) IN (14)
Based on (13), we formulate pso1 (Rs) as
pso1 (Rs) = Pr
n
Cb  Rs < ~Ce jCb   Ce  Rs
o
= Pr

b < 2
Rs (1 + ~e)  1
b  2Rs (1 + e)  1	
=
Pr

b < 2
Rs (1 + ~e)  1; b  2Rs (1 + e)  1
	
Pr fb  2Rs (1 + e)  1g :
(59)
We re-express the numerator of pso1 (Rs) as
Pr

b < 2
Rs (1 + ~e)  1; b  2Rs (1 + e)  1
	
= Pr

~e > 2
 Rs (1 + b)  1; e  2 Rs (1 + b)  1
	
=
Z 1
2Rs 1
Z 2 Rs (1+x) 1
0
1fe (y) dy| {z }
2
fb (x) dx; (60)
where 1 is
1 =
Z 1
2 Rs (1+x) 1
f~eje (z jy ) dz: (61)
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON VEHICULAR TECHNOLOGY, ACCEPTED FOR PUBLICATION 13
Recall that ~e and e are two correlated exponential RVs. The
conditional PDF of ~e conditioned on a given e is given by
f~eje (z jy ) =
1
(1  2e) e
exp

  z + 
2
ey
(1  2e) e

 I0

2e
p
zy
(1  2e) e

: (62)
We then substitute (62) into (61) to derive 1 as
1 = Q1
 s
22ey
(1  2e) e
;
s
21 Rs (x+ 1)  2
(1  2e) e
!
: (63)
With the help of (55) and (56), the series representation of 1
is obtained as
1 =exp

 
2
ey + 2
 Rsx+ 2 Rs   1
(1  2e) e
 1X
n=0
1X
k=0
1
k!
 
2(n+k)
e yn+k
 
2 Rsx+ 2 Rs   1k
  (n+ k + 1) ((1  2e) e)n+2k
: (64)
Substituting (64) into 2, we obtain the series representation
of 2 as
2 =exp

  x+ 1  2
Rs
(1  2e) 2Rse
 1X
n=0
1X
k=0

2(n+k)
e
 
1  2e

k!((1  2e) e)k


x+ 1  2Rs
2Rs
k 
1  exp

  x+ 1  2
Rs
(1  2e) 2Rse


n+kX
m=0
1
m!

x+ 1  2Rs
(1  2e) 2Rse
m#
: (65)
Finally, we substitute (65) into (60) and solve the resultant
integrals to obtain numerator of pso1 (Rs). Hence, pso1 (Rs)
in (14) can be obtained.
APPENDIX C
DERIVATION OF prst1 (Rs) IN (18)
Based on (17), we formulate prst1 (Rs) as
prst1 (Rs) = Pr
n
~Cb  Cb; Cb  Rs  ~Ce jCb   Ce  Rs
o
= Pr

~b  b; b  2Rs (1+~e) 1
b  2Rs (1+e) 1	
=
Pr

~b  b; b  2Rs (1+~e) 1; b  2Rs (1+e) 1
	
Pr fb  2Rs (1+e) 1g :
(66)
By re-expressing the numerator of prst1 (Rs) we obtain
Pr

~b  b; ~e  1 + b
2Rs
  1; e  1 + b
2Rs
  1

=
Z 1
2Rs 1
12fb (x) dx; (67)
where 1 is
1 = Pr f~b  xg =
Z 1
x
f~bjb (w jx ) dw; (68)
and 2 is
2 = Pr

~e  2 Rs (1 + x)  1; e  2 Rs (1 + x)  1
	
=
Z 2 Rs (1+x) 1
0
Z 2 Rs (1+x) 1
0
f~eje (z jy ) dzfe (y) dy:
(69)
With the help of 1 in Appendix A and 2 in Appendix B,
we obtain the series representations of 1 and 2 as
1 = 1  1 (70)
and
2 = 1  exp

 2
 Rsx+ 2 Rs   1
e

  2; (71)
where 1 is given by (57) and 2 is given by (65).
Finally, we substitute (70) and (71) into (67) and solve the
resultant integrals, the numerator of prst1 (Rs) is obtained.
Using (10), prst1 (Rs) in (18) can be obtained.
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